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I. INTRODUCTION
HE GENERAL AVIATION Revitalization Act (GARA) was
enacted in the United States when signed by President Clin-
ton on August 17, 1994.1 GARA is a federal statute of repose
that places an eighteen-year time limit on bringing a products
liability action against manufacturers of allegedly defective air-
craft and/or component parts that cause an accident.
This Article takes a close look at GARA and its provisions.
The first part discusses GARA's scope of application and those
who may assert the defense. The second part examines the ap-
plication of GARA to general aviation aircraft accidents. The
third part analyzes certain aspects of GARA and discusses antici-
pated problems in the litigation arena. Recent GARA case law is
also incorporated throughout the Article.
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW
GARA was passed in response to an onslaught of public pres-
sure from the U.S. general aviation industry, including the fol-
lowing: General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, Experimental Aircraft Associa-
tion, International Association of Machinists, Helicopter Associ-
ation International, National Business Aircraft Association, and
National Air Transportation Association.2  The pressure
stemmed from a near cessation of manufacturing activity in the
industry allegedly caused by excessive products liability lawsuit
damage awards and related litigation costs. 3 Such costs had
risen significantly since the 1970s when strict liability became a
viable cause of action against manufacturers in the aviation in-
dustry.4 Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum and Representative
Dan Glickman played a significant role in pushing the legisla-
1 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994).
2 Christopher C. McNatt, Jr. & Steven L. England, The Push for Statutes of Repose
in GeneralAviation, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 323, 326 (1995). The forces that had opposed
GARA from the start were the American Trial Lawyers Association and citizen
organizations such as Citizen Action and Public Citizen. Id. at 327.




non through both the House and Senate,5 as Kansas had a very
large segment of the general aviation manufacturing industry.
Of the world's small aircraft, approximately seventy-five per-
cent operate in the United States.6 More than 5000 small com-
munities use general aviation as their access to the domestic
scheduled air carrier market.7 General aviation and its related
industries contribute more than $40 billion annually to the U.S.
economy, along with employing more than 540,000 people.8
Proponents of GARA claim that industries related to general avi-
ation have lost 100,000jobs due to the high number of products
liability suits.' Though some experts believe that the decline of
general aviation aircraft manufacturing was caused by other fac-
tors unrelated to liability costs, they concede that the dramatic
rise in costs due to product liability exposure and related manu-
facturer product insurance premiums is significant. 10 After
years of industry lobbying, negotiating, drafting, and redrafting,
the final compromised result is GARA.
GARA's purpose is to:
[E]stablish a Federal statute of repose to protect general aviation
manufacturers from long-term liability in those instances where a
particular aircraft has been in operation for a considerable
number of years. A statute of repose is a legal recognition that,
after an extended period of time, a product has demonstrated its
safety and quality, and that it is not reasonable to hold a manu-
facturer legally responsible for an accident or injury occurring
after that much time has elapsed.11
The first reported cases involving the GARA defense indicate
that GARA is subject to very strictjudicial scrutiny." There is an
5 Id. at 326. The House passed the bill by a clear majority, and the Senate
voted 91 to 8 in favor of the bill. See Senate Passed, 91-8, A Bill Setting 18-Year
Statute of Repose, COMMUTER REGIONAL AIRLINE NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 19.
6 Scott E. Tarry & Lawrence J. Truitt, Rhetoric and Reality: Tort Reform and the
Uncertain Future of General Aviation, 61 J. AIR L. & CoM. 163, 167 (1995).
7 McNatt & England, supra note 2, at 324.
8 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 6, at 167.
9 McNatt & England, supra note 2, at 325.
10 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 6, at 193.
11 140 CONG. REc. H4998-99 (daily ed.June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Fish).
The anticipated spool-up in production and orders has been slow. As of April
1996, the first manufactured Cessna 172 in 10 years made its maiden trial flight;
meanwhile, Cessna had only 300 deposited agreements to purchase its light air-
craft. First New Cessna 172 Flies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 29, 1996, at 21.
12 See, e.g., Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 340, 342-43
(E.D. Cal. 1996); Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., H-95-5046, 1996 WL
616321, at *5-11 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996).
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indication that once a case is arguably within GARA's ambit,
plaintiff's counsel will argue that one of the four exceptions ap-
plies, most notably the "misrepresentation, concealment or with-
holding of information" exception.13
III. THE SCOPE OF GARA'S APPLICATION TO "GENERAL
AVIATION AIRCRAFT"
GARA contains four sections: short title, time limitations, def-
initions, and effective date. 4
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES "GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT"
GARA applies to accidents involving "general aviation air-
craft," which is defined in subsection (c) as:
[A] ny aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness cer-
tificate has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, which, at the time such certificate was
originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than
20 passengers, and which was not, at the time of the accident,
engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined
under regulations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 .... 15
The first inquiry looks to the word "aircraft" to determine the
scope of application. Does "aircraft" include helicopters, glid-
ers, gyrocopters, blimps, and hot air balloons? The Federal Avi-
ation Act provides guidance. Aircraft means "any contrivance
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air."' 6 This
broad definition includes virtually anything that is built with the
intent of departing company with the ground.
A more difficult problem arises with regard to the word "gen-
eral," which is not defined in GARA. GARA only requires the
issuance of either a type certificate or airworthiness certificate
for its statute of repose to apply. 7 Once one of those certifi-
cates is issued, it appears that the aircraft is considered one of
"general aviation," unless it is being used for a "scheduled pas-
senger-carrying operation" at the time of the accident.'8
13 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(b)(1); see also discussion infra part VII.
14 The complete version of GARA is located in the appendix to this Article.
'5 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(c) (citation omitted).
16 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (1994).




Interestingly, GARA distinguishes between a "civil aircraft,"
which means "an aircraft except a public aircraft," 19 and a "pub-
lic aircraft." A public aircraft is an aircraft used only for the
United States government, and it is not per se bound by or re-
quired to comply with the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).o
If public aircraft are not issued a type or airworthiness certifi-
cate, GARA clearly would not apply. However, since numerous
government transport planes are identical to their civilian coun-
terparts, they nonetheless may have been issued a type certifi-
cate, and may arguably be governed by GARA, even though
governmental use of the aircraft may not be considered "general
aviation." Such use does not appear to be within the purpose,
intent, or common definition of general aviation. Another gray
area arises when certificated aircraft are leased for governmen-
tal use-that is, a non-general aviation function, which would
likely preclude the application of GARA, depending on the facts
and underlying lease arrangement. 21
19 Id. § 40102(a)(16).
20 Id. § 40102 (a) (37). The United States Code specifically defines "public
aircraft":
(A) means an aircraft-
(i) used only for the United States Government; or
(ii) owned and operated (except for commercial purposes), or
exclusively leased for at least 90 continuous days, by a government
(except the United States Government), including a State, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States,
or political subdivision of that government; but
(B) does not include a government-owned aircraft-
(i) transporting property for commercial purposes; or
(ii) transporting passengers other than-
(I) transporting (for other than commercial purposes)
crewmembers or other persons aboard the aircraft whose presence
is required to perform, or is associated with the performance of, a
governmental function such as firefighting, search and rescue, law
enforcement, aeronautical research, or biological or geological re-
source management; or
(II) transporting (for other than commercial purposes) per-
sons aboard the aircraft if the aircraft is operated by the Armed
Forces or an intelligence agency of the United States.
Id.
21 For example, if government employees charter an aircraft under FAR Part
135, GARA would apply. However, if the government leases a Beech King Air for
six months, the aircraft or component manufacturer would have a difficult time
convincing a court that the aircraft was used in "general aviation," even if it had a
type or airworthiness certificate.
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B. THE TYPE CERTIFICATE AND AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE
The first element that must be met for an aircraft to fall
within GARA is that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
must have issued it a type certificate or an airworthiness certifi-
cate.22 If not, the aircraft is not considered a general aviation
aircraft under GARA, and, thus, the manufacturer is not entitled
to protection under GARA.23 Even if a certificate is suspended
or revoked, all that appears to be required is the original issu-
ance of the certificate by the FAA, as the manufacturer does not
retain any control over the continuing airworthiness of its air-
craft after delivery.
With regard to defining type and airworthiness certificates,
Section 3 of GARA refers to another section of the United States
Code that defines each term. Type certificates are issued for
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances.24 They are
issued only after the FAA determines that each submitted part
"is properly designed and manufactured, performs properly,
and meets the regulations and minimum standards pre-
scribed. ' 25 Type certificates are issued to ensure that aircraft
and their parts are safe. 26 According to the FAR, "type," as "used
with respect to the certification of aircraft, means those aircraft
which are similar in design." 27 Examples include a DC-7 and a
DC-7C.28 Unlike airworthiness certificates, type certificates are
issued on approval of the design, specifications, and manufac-
turing process.29 Thus, the FAA does not issue a type certificate
for each part, but it may specify in the FAR the appliances that
require a type certificate.30 Manufacturers are left to ensure
that their parts fully comply with the type certificate.
Airworthiness certificates are issued by the FAA to each air-
craft upon request from an aircraft's registered owner, who is
typically the manufacturer before the initial sale of the aircraft.
They are issued when the FAA "finds that the aircraft conforms
22 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (c).
23 Id.
24 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) (1994).
25 Id. § 44704(a) (2).
26 Id.
27 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1996). Part 21 of the FAR sets forth the regulations for type
certificates (subpart B), provisional type certificates (subpart C), changes to type
certificates (subpart D), supplemental type certificates (subpart E), and produc-
tion type certificates (subpart F). See 14 C.F.R. § 21 (1996).
28 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
29 Id.
3o 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a) (2) (A).
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to its type certificate and, after inspection, is in condition for
safe operation." 31 Airworthiness certificates are classified by the
regulations as "standard" and "special." Standard airworthiness
certificates are issued "for aircraft type certificated in the nor-
mal, utility, acrobatic, commuter, or transport category ... and
for aircraft designated by the Administrator as special classes of
aircraft."32 Special airworthiness certificates are "primary, re-
stricted, limited, and provisional airworthiness certificates, spe-
cial flight permits, and experimental certificates. 33
Importantly, in light of the significant increase in the manufac-
turing and use of home-built aircraft, the operation of these air-
craft requires an experimental airworthiness certificate, which
technically brings them under the definition of general aviation
aircraft because they are issued an airworthiness certificate.34
Thus, GARA likely would protect manufacturers of home-built
aircraft. 3 Under the FAR, even short term ferry permits are
considered airworthiness certificates.3 6 Thus, it appears that any
civil aircraft operating lawfully will be considered to have at least
one type of airworthiness certificate that brings it within the
scope of GARA.
"General aviation aircraft" must be issued either a type certifi-
cate or an airworthiness certificate in order to fly lawfully. Yet,
issuance of an airworthiness certificate is not required for GARA
to apply as long as the aircraft was issued a type certificate.
C. MAXIMUM PASSENGER SEATING CAPACITY
The second qualifying factor with regard to general aviation
aircraft is that at the time the type and/or airworthiness certifi-
cate was "originally issued, [the aircraft] had a maximum seating
capacity of fewer than 20 passengers." 3 This figure does not
include seating for the pilot and copilot, as they are
"crewmembers," not "passengers. '3 9 Maximum seating capacity
31 Id. § 447 04(c).
32 14 C.F.R. § 21.175(a) (1996).
33 Id. § 21.175(b).
34 See id. § 21.191(g),(h).
35 See id. (dealing with amateur-built and kit-built aircraft).
36 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.197 (1996).
37 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (c).
38 Id.
39 14 C.F.R. § 129.25(a)(3) (1996) explains that "passenger seating configura-
tion" means:
[T]he total number of seats for which the aircraft is type certifi-
cated that can be made available for passenger use aboard a flight
1996]
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will usually be contained in the type certificate data sheets,
which prescribe the applicable limitations for each particular
aircraft model.4 °
D. NOT ENGAGED IN SCHEDULED PASSENGER-CARRYING
OPERATIONS
The third and final limitation contained in the definition of
general aviation aircraft is that "at the time of the accident, [the
aircraft was not] engaged in scheduled passenger-carrying oper-
ations as defined under regulations in effect under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. '' 41 Obviously, general aviation would not
include scheduled air carrier services. Part 108 (Airplane Oper-
ator Security) and Part 129 (Foreign Air Carrier Operations) of
the Code of Federal Regulations both define "scheduled passen-
ger operations" as follows: "holding out to the public of air
transportation service for passengers from identified air termi-
nals at a set time announced by timetable or schedule published
in a newspaper, magazine, or other advertising medium. '4 2 This
definition is somewhat vague because it requires the timetable
or schedule to be published in an advertising medium. Argua-
bly, a carrier who advertises its routes only, but who has its timeta-
bles available on a Computer Reservation System, might not fall
within the technical definition of scheduled passenger opera-
tions even though its operations would be scheduled. Non-
scheduled charter operations, on the other hand, clearly fall
within the ambit of GARA.4 3
Part 135 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Air Taxi Opera-
tors and Commercial Operators) defines "scheduled passenger-
carrying operations" as "passenger-carrying operations that are
and includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks but is
available for revenue purposes on other occasions.
40 Part 125 of the FAR contains special regulations for aircraft that have a seat-
ing capacity for 20 or more passengers. See 14 C.F.R. § 125.1 (1996). It is tided
"Certification and Operations: Airplanes Having a Seating Capacity of 20 or
More Passengers or a Maximum Payload Capacity of 6000 Pounds or More." Id.
pt. 125. Part 125 may have been used as a reference to set the line of demarca-
tion of "general aviation aircraft" at seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers.
It is not clear why GARA did not also include the maximum payload provision
also contained in Part 125. See id. § 125.9.
41 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2) (c).
42 14 C.F.R. § 108.3(e) (1996); id. § 129.25(a)(6). It is noted that GARA looks
to the definition of "scheduled passenger-carrying operations" as it is defined "at
the time of the accident." 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(c).
43 14 C.F.R. §§ 108.1 & 108.3(e).
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conducted in accordance with a published schedule[,] which
covers at least five round trips per week on at least one route
between two or more points, includes dates or times (or both),
and is openly advertised or otherwise made readily available to
the general public."44
Why the different application of GARA to different types of
flight operations? The distinguishing factor is that scheduled
air services are not within the realm of general aviation and are
governed by a different set of regulations for operation, pilot
requirements, and maintenance scheduling. The regulations
for scheduled passenger operations have stricter safety require-
ments, allowing the manufacturers to set tighter maintenance
schedules and, thus, play a continuing role in the safety mainte-
nance and repair of aircraft.
Therefore, it is the aircraft's functional use at the time of the
accident-whether the flight was scheduled or nonscheduled-
that will determine whether or not GARA applies. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys will certainly want to establish that the flight was "sched-
uled" if their case would otherwise be subject to GARA's statute
of repose.
IV. THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR PERIOD OF REPOSE
Section 2 of the General Aviation Revitalization Act is entitled
"Time Limitations on Civil Actions Against Aircraft Manufactur-
ers."45 Subsection (a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b), no civil action for damages
for death or injury to persons or damage to property arising out
of an accident involving a general aviation aircraft may be
brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufac-
turer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part
of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident
occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser
or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
'4 14 C.F.R. § 135.261(b)(1) (1996). This definition is more narrow than
those found in Parts 108 and 129, and should not be used under GARA. It is
limited by its own terms because it only applies to 14 C.F.R. § 135.265, which sets
forth "[f] light time limitations and rest requirements" for scheduled operations.
See id. § 135.265.
45 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2).
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(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person en-
gaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft ....46
The significant term "limitation period" is defined in Section 3
to mean "18 years with respect to general aviation aircraft and
the components, systems, subassemblies, and other parts of such
aircraft. " 4 7
The time limitation is important because it determines when
the running of the statute commences and what type of act must
fall within the eighteen-year time period. Subsections 1 (A) and
(B) appear clear and unambiguous. However, what constitutes
"delivery of the aircraft" may be a key issue in close-call cases.
Furthermore, a manufacturer who asserts a GARA defense will
have the burden to prove the date of delivery.4 8
GARA is unique in defining what must occur within the eight-
een-year limit. Subsection (a) clearly states that the "accident" is
the event that must occur within the limitations period.49 Nu-
merous other statutes have a more defense-oriented event, pro-
viding that the legal action must be filed within the limitations
period.5" Under GARA, once the accident that caused the in-
jury occurs within the repose period, the lawsuit needs only be
filed within the applicable statute of limitations period.5'
Another consideration is the use of the word "accident" in
Section 2, which requires that the damage arise "out of an acci-
dent. '52 Although GARA does not define "accident," a provision
of the Code of Federal Regulations provides some guidance, de-
fining an "aircraft accident" to mean "an occurrence associated
with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight
and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any per-
son suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft re-
ceives substantial damage."53
46 Id. § 40101 (2) (a).
47 Id. § 40101(3).
48 Some states use the date that the product was first used for its intended
purpose as the triggering date, see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-107 (1987),
while other states use the date that the manufacturer relinquishes control of the
product, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (1991 & Supp. 1995).
49 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2) (a).
50 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F) (1994).
51 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(a).
52 See id.
53 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1995). This provision also specifically defines "serious
injury" and "substantial damage."
394
AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
It is conceivable that an incident may occur that does not fall
within this definition of accident. An example is the temporary
failure of an aircraft engine that caused emotional distress to
passengers on board even though the plane landed safely. How-
ever, it is absurd to think that GARA was intended to cover only
injuries considered to be more serious under the technical defi-
nition of accident. Furthermore, the above definition is limited
in its application to Part 830 of the Code of Federal Regulations
involving notification and reporting of accidents and inci-
dents. 54 This Article refers to that definition merely to lend gui-
dance to an otherwise unclear term. A much broader definition
of accident is contained in the 1985 United States Supreme
Court's decision in Air France v. Saks.55 Writing for the majority,
justice O'Connor held that an accident is an event that is
"caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger."5 The definition in Saks, however, is
limited to application under the Warsaw Convention.57
One issue that has arisen in recent GARA case law is deter-
mining the triggering date of GARA when the aircraft manuals
(or updates to the manuals) are issued less than eighteen years
before the accident. In Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron,58 the plain-
tiff alleged that the crash of a Bell 206 helicopter was caused, in
part, by the defendant's failure to provide sufficient mainte-
nance manual instructions for inspecting an engine compressor
stator vane.59 Defendant Bell had issued and revised the manual
approximately two times each year since 1974. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the delivery of the manuals within the repose period
constituted a new triggering of the time period. The court dis-
agreed, stating:
Section 2(a) (2) of GARA states that a replacement "component,
system, subassembly, or other part" must replace a "component,
54 49 C.F.R. pt. 830 is entitled "Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Acci-
dents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage,
Mail, Cargo, and Records."
55 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
56 Id. at 405.
57 See id.
58 No. H-95-5046, 1996 WL 617321, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996).
59 In its decision, the court quoted from the Israeli government's accident in-
vestigation report, which stated: "The manufacturer's instruction relating to the
inspection of the engine compressor stator vanes erosion, during the periodical
checks, was drafted in a misleading manner, which brought up the understand-
ing that thickness had to be checked at the outer end rather than at the root of
the vane." Id. at *5.
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system .... or other part". "originally in" or "added to" the air-
craft. The manual was not a "part" "originally in" or "added to"
the aircraft. The manual revisions are not a replacement "com-
ponent, system, subassembly, or other part" that started a new
limitations period under section 2(2) (a).6"
From a policy standpoint, Alter presents a catch-22 situation.
On the one hand, as long as manufacturers are protected under
GARA with regard to updating their aircraft manuals, they have
a complete incentive to do so without the concern of additional
liability exposure. Yet, on the other hand, it is difficult to distin-
guish between the triggering of a new statute of repose for a new
part that is required by the manufacturer to be replaced for
safety reasons, and no new triggering date when the manufac-
turer changes or revises its maintenance manual to make the
aircraft safer for flight. The continued maintenance of an air-
craft in accordance with the manufacturer's manual is no less
significant than the replacement of aircraft parts. When a part
is no longer safe, it is replaced. When a maintenance procedure
is no longer safe, it is revised. Yet, a replacement part will trig-
ger a new period, while under Alter, a revised manual will not,
even when the overall effect on safety may be the same. Insuffi-
cient maintenance manuals may contribute to a product's fail-
ure, just as a design or manufacturing defect would cause a
product to fail.
V. ENTITIES WHO MAY ASSERT THE GARA DEFENSE
A. U.S. MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS
Section 2(a) prevents suit "against the manufacturer of the
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, sub-
assembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manu-
facturer. ' 61 Therefore, only manufacturers are protected by
GARA. United States manufacturers are the primary target of
the products liability suits since they are blamed for any defect
in their aircraft. Moreover, they are easy targets because they
have deep pockets. As a result of being hit with the largest dam-
age awards, U.S. aircraft manufacturers have lobbied for and re-
ceived favorable legislation. Consequently, they are ultimately
protected under GARA.
60 Id. at *6.
61 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (a).
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But what about distributors, sellers, and lessors who .do not
fall squarely within the definition of manufacturers? It does not
appear that GARA protects them per se; however, state law may
allow them to assert all defenses available to the manufacturer,
which might include GARA. Some states, for products liability
purposes, may include all entities in the chain of distribution in
their definition of "manufacturer."" Under those circum-
stances, distributors, sellers, and lessors can be considered a
manufacturer under GARA unless preempted by federal com-
mon law (for example, where a significant conflict exists be-
tween federal and state law, or where a unique federal interest
arises to apply its own law).63
Furthermore, many states have their own statutes of repose
that may also act to protect non-manufacturers in the chain of
distribution.6 4 Even though the underlying policy behind GARA
should also protect non-manufacturers, there is no provision
that specifically includes them. However, if not covered under
GARA and absent strict liability, the plaintiffs will have a difficult
burden of proof in products liability claims against non-
manufacturers.
The tentative draft of the new Restatement of the Law (Third)
of Torts recognizes claims in strict liability for "one who sells or
otherwise distributes a product."65 This broad definition would
include the manufacturer and those in the chain of distribution,
62 For example, the term "manufacturer" is defined under the California Busi-
ness and Professional Code to include any "distributor of a manufacturer who
sells, transfers, or exchanges an appliance to or with a retailer." CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 22410(b) (West 1987).
65 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
64 For a review of state statutes of repose that were in effect at the time of the
passage of GARA, see McNatt & England, supra note 2, at 327-42.
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1995). The defi-
nition of "one who sells or otherwise distributes" is as follows:
(a) One "sells" a product when, in a commercial context, one
transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or for
resale leading to ultimate use or consumption. Commercial prod-
uct sellers include, but are not limited to, manufacturers, wholesal-
ers, and retailers.
(b) One "otherwise distributes" a product when, in a commercial
context other than a sale, one provides the product to another
either for use or consumption or as a preliminary step leading to
ultimate use or consumption. Commercial nonsale product distrib-
utors include, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and those who
provide products to others as a means of promoting either the use
or consumption of such products or some other commercial
activity.
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including wholesalers and retailers. Therefore, even though in-
dividual state domestic law will govern claims in strict liability
(which is usually the only viable cause of action against entities
in the chain of distribution), non-manufacturers who sell air-
craft or their component parts will not be covered under GARA
unless they fall within the definition of "manufacturer."
The second limitation contained in Section 2(a) of GARA
provides that GARA only applies to manufacturers of "any new
component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft."66
The word "new" seems to imply the original manufacturer.
However, some component parts, such as engines, are rebuilt
and "zero timed" and, thus, returned to their original specifica-
tions, even though the work may be performed by someone
other than the original manufacturer. 67 The concern here is
that for products liability purposes, some states treat entities
who rebuild and/or overhaul component parts as manufactur-
(c) One also "sells or otherwise distributes" a product when, in a
commercial context, one provides a combination of products and
services and either the transaction taken as a whole, or the product
component thereof, satisfies the criteria in Subsection (a) or (b).
Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (a).
67 The FAA recently defined "overhauled" and "rebuilt":
Overhauled. Describes an airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appli-
ance, or component part using methods, techniques, and practices
acceptable to the Administrator, which has undergone the
following:
(1) Has been disassembled, cleaned, inspected, repaired when
necessary, and reassembled to the extent possible.
(2) Has been tested in accordance with approved standards and
technical data, or current standards and technical data acceptable
to the Administrator (i.e. manufacturer's data), which have been
developed and documented by the holder of one of the following:
(a) TC [Type Certificate]
(b) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), or material, part,
process, or appliance approval under section 21.305.
(c) PMA [Parts Manufacturer Approval]
Rebuilt. Describes an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller,
or appliance, using new or used parts that conform to new part
tolerances and limits or to approved oversized or undersized
dimensions that has undergone the following:
(1) Has been disassembled, cleaned, inspected, repaired as nec-
essary, and reassembled to the extent possible.
(2) Has been tested to the same tolerances and limits as a new
item.
FAA U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 20-62D (May 24, 1996).
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ers for strict liability application. 6 However, for all intentional
purposes and in light of GARA, such entities would not be con-
sidered manufacturers and, thus, would not be protected under
the federal statute of repose.
One situation that is certain to arise is the failure of a part
that is used for replacement during the overhaul or rebuilding
of an original component part. The original part may be more
than eighteen years old (and the manufacturer, therefore, is
protected under GARA for that part), but the replacement part
is less than eighteen years old. In that situation, it appears clear
that the eighteen-year statute of repose period begins to run
when the work involving the "subassembly" or "other part" is
completed, and the part is installed as a "replacement or
addition."6 9
The last qualification under Section 2 of GARA is that the
manufacturer is only protected "in its capacity as a manufac-
turer."70 When the manufacturer acts in any capacity other than
its role in the manufacturing of the original part, it loses the
protection of GARA to the extent that its role caused or contrib-
uted to the accident. What other role might a manufacturer
play? Many component part manufacturers offer overhaul and
part rebuilding services. In addition, some manufacturers are
becoming involved in certain maintenance programs related to
their own aircraft, as their expertise and facilities allow them to
actively compete in the industry.71 As a result, if a manufacturer
plays a role deviating from that of an original manufacturer, it
will not reap protection under GARA.
B. FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS
The undisputed intent of GARA is to protect the U.S. general
aviation manufacturing industry.7 2 However, GARA does not
distinguish between domestic and foreign manufacturers. It ap-
68 See generally Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626, 629
(Ohio 1991) ("strict liability applies with equal force to a commercial entity en-
gaged in remanufacturing or rebuilding a defective product"); Michalko v.
Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 182 (N.J. 1982) (a party who "under-
takes to rebuild part of a machine in accordance with the specifications of the
owner" can be held strictly liable).
69 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (a) (2).
70 Id. § 40101 (2) (a).
71 For a review of the status and competition of the aircraft maintenance indus-
try, see AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 11, 1996, at 44-53, which is a special
issue covering numerous maintenance topics.
72 See discussion supra part II.
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plies to "the manufacturer of the aircraft [and] the manufac-
turer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part
of the aircraft." 3 For GARA to apply to a foreign manufacturer,
the "general aviation aircraft" must have been issued a type cer-
tificate or airworthiness certificate by the FAA."4
In Pollack v. Agusta, S.P.A.,7b an aircraft crashed into an apart-
ment building in Santa Monica, California. The three occu-
pants of the aircraft were killed, and their survivors brought suit
against the manufacturer of the aircraft engine, Marchetti, an
instrument of the Italian government. The action was dismissed
based on GARA; however, the decision did not indicate whether
a foreign manufacturer is barred from raising GARA as a
defense.76
C. MANUFACTURERS OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN FOREIGN
ACCIDENTS
The extraterritorial limits of GARA have been tested in at
least one case. In Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,77 Ilan Alter
was killed after the Bell 206 helicopter of which he was a passen-
ger crashed in Israel. The plaintiff brought suit in state district
court in Texas, but defendants Bell and General Motors re-
moved the case to federal court. One argument raised in re-
sponse to the defendants' GARA defense was that GARA did not
apply to accidents in a foreign country, even though the suit was
brought in the U.S. 78
The Alter decision first distinguished Smith v. United States79
and Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian American Oil Co.80 Smith and
Boureslan involved statutes that created a cause of action,
whereas Alter concerned GARA, which prevented claims against
manufacturers.8 1 The Alter court recognized that the plaintiffs
position "would have the anomalous effect of preventing liti-
73 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (a).
74 Id. at § 40101 (2) (c).
75 No. CV 94-7769, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1995).
76 See id. at 3-6.
77 No. H-95-5046, 1996 WL 617321, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1996).
78 Id. at *10.
79 507 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1993) (holding that there was no waiver of the U.S.
government's sovereign immunity for tort claims arising in Antarctica under the
Federal Tort Claims Act).
80 892 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that U.S. employers
employing U.S. citizens outside the U.S. are not regulated by Title VII), affd sub
nom. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244 (1991).
81 Alter, 1996 WL 617321, at *10.
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gants from bringing an action in the United States for an acci-
dent occurring in the United States while allowing litigants to
bring the same action in the United States if the accident oc-
curred abroad. '8 2 In barring the claims against Bell, the court
noted that the action was based on Texas state law, and that it
was GARA's intent to bar state law claims, even when the acci-
dent occurred outside the United States. 83
VI. APPLICATION OF GARA TO AIRCRAFT PARTS
Section (2) (a) (2) of GARA provides another avenue of pro-
tection for aircraft parts that are originally in, or subsequently
added to, an aircraft. The provision states:
[W]ith respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the air-
craft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, injury, or
damage, after the applicable limitation period beginning on the
date of completion of the replacement or addition.84
With regard to parts that are subsequently used as replace-
ment parts or added to the aircraft, GARA is clear that if those
parts are "new," the repose period begins to run "on the date of
completion of the replacement or addition" of those parts.8 5
However, when replacement or added parts are not new but are
used at the time of installation, GARA is not clear as to whether
or not it applies. Nowhere does GARA discuss or even mention
its application to used parts. The first sentence of Section
2(a) (2) refers to "any new component, system, subassembly, or
other part."86 A fair reading of this phrase is that the word
"new" refers to all possible parts that can be added to the air-
craft, including "other part[s]." In addition, since the statute of
repose commences upon "completion of the replacement or ad-
dition," it can only apply to new parts because used parts would
have a different triggering date that begins when they were orig-
inally new and placed into service on an aircraft (which may not
be the aircraft involved in the accident). Subsequently installed
used parts would not have been originally placed on the aircraft
that was involved in the accident, as set forth in the last phrase
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2)(a)(2) (emphasis added).
85 Id.
86 Id. (emphasis added).
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of Section 2(a) (2). Thus, when parts are originally placed on an
aircraft, the statute begins to run on such parts upon "delivery"
of the aircraft. Once the statute is triggered for those parts pur-
suant to GARA, the statute continues to run on those parts even
if they are subsequently removed and installed on another air-
craft as a used part.87
An example is Estate of Glover v. American Resource Corp.,88
which involved an action stemming from a 1995 aircraft acci-
dent in Argentina. General Electric, the manufacturer of the
aircraft's engine, moved for summaryjudgment based upon the
running of GARA's eighteen-year statute of repose. It was undis-
puted that the engines were installed on other aircraft in 1972
and 1973 respectively. The same engines were subsequently in-
stalled as used engines on the subject aircraft in 1988. After
original installation, GE performed ordinary and routine main-
tenance on the engines. GE's motion was denied on burden of
proof grounds because GE had "not shown that it did not re-
place any 'component, system, subassembly, or other part'
which caused the crash."89 The court went on to note that
"[t] he fact that General Electric did not recondition or overhaul
the engines and performed only routine maintenance does not
raise the reasonable inference that it did not replace any part
which might have caused the crash. Thus, it has not met its bur-
den of showing [that] it is entitled to judgment."90
Glover supports the fact that once a part is originally installed
on an aircraft, GARA's eighteen-year statute of repose begins to
run, even when the part is removed and installed as a used part
on another aircraft. Glover also stands for the proposition that
defendant manufacturers who also perform subsequent mainte-
nance on a part must prove that they did not replace any part
with a new part (that may have caused the accident) within the
eighteen-year period.
Another problem arises in determining whether or not rebuilt
parts and overhauled parts that are placed on an aircraft are
considered new for the purposes of GARA. In other words, does
87 It is important to note that GARA requires that all new parts be installed on
aircraft in order for the statute to commence running. If the parts become used
for something other than aircraft use, the statute only commences running, if at
all, once placed on an aircraft in a used state. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2).
88 No. 160673, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1996).




the statute begin to run anew when a once used part is over-
hauled or rebuilt?
A strong argument can be made under the FAR and FAA Ad-
visory Circular 20-62D 91 that a rebuilt part should be treated as a
new part, and that the running of GARA should start anew when
the rebuilt part is placed on an aircraft. The basis for this argu-
ment is that in order for a part to be considered "rebuilt" under
the FAA Advisory Circular 20-62D, it must have "been tested to
the same tolerances and limits as a new item."92 A rebuilt part
also can be "zero timed" per cycle and have the same opera-
tional time per cycle limits as if it were new. Thus, a strong argu-
ment can be made that rebuilt parts are new parts, which, when
installed as rebuilt, should start the GARA statute of repose run-
ning anew. When an original manufacturer rebuilds a part, it
should be subject to a new running of GARA. However, GARA
should protect an original manufacturer when it neither re-
builds the part nor supplies component parts for the rebuilt
part.
On another note, an entity that is not the original manufac-
turer but that rebuilds a part may be considered a part manufac-
turer for products liability purposes, depending on the
applicable law. If the part was rebuilt and installed more than
eighteen years before it fails, the rebuilding entity will certainly
argue that it was a manufacturer for the purposes of asserting
GARA as a defense.
An "overhauled" part, on the other hand, does not have to
meet the new tolerances and limits of the original part. Over-
hauled parts merely need to be repaired to a condition accepta-
ble to the FAA as established by either the holder of the Type
Certificate, the Supplemental Type Certificate, or the Parts
Manufacturer Approval.9" Whether or not overhauled parts
should be considered new under GARA will be determined on a
case-by-case basis, with each case relying on fact-intensive discov-
ery. The nature and extent of the overhaul will be decisive. On
the one hand, a company overhauling a part may not reasonably
expect to be exposed to liability for the next eighteen years if
the part is considered new. On the other hand, purchasers of
an overhauled part will certainly not expect the statute of repose
to have run before the part is even installed on their aircraft.
91 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 20-62D (May 24, 1996).
92 Id. at 40)(2) (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 4(i) (2).
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Claims for negligent maintenance and repair will also be in-
cluded in a products liability case where the failed part was re-
built or overhauled. As discussed previously, some courts may
treat rebuilding and overhaul as repair while others consider
them to be the manufacture of a product and, therefore, subject
to strict liability. 4
This apparent problem with used parts is significant because
the general aviation industry has a large pool of and market for
used parts, including the exchange of worn engines for rebuilt
or overhauled engines that are not new. In order to determine
the status of a failed component or its subparts, plaintiffs' attor-
neys should immediately obtain the aircraft and engine log-
books, along with all work orders and invoices. In addition, the
mechanics who worked on the aircraft should be interviewed to
determine if any parts or components were installed on the air-
craft during the limitation period.
An instructive case on whether GARA applies to used parts is
Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,95 which involved claims for
personal injury and property damage stemming from a helicop-
ter accident in California. The action was filed in federal court
after passage of GARA and, therefore, was governed by GARA.
The court granted Bell's motion for summary judgment based
on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that
Bell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under GARA
since it was undisputed that the subject helicopter and failed
IN See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. A majority of jurisdictions do not
recognize strict liability against those who merely perform repairs. See Winans v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449, 1452 (5th Cir. 1983) (citingJohnson v. Wil-
liam C. Ellis & Sons, 604 F.2d 950, 955 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing collective au-
thorities); contra Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093,
1098-99 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff may recover for strict liability
against the defendant who rebuilt plaintiffs turbine engine, but installed a defec-
tive and inadequately inspected used part that caused the engine to explode).
The Consumers Power court recognized that New Jersey imposes strict liability on
the providers of defective repair and rebuilding services. Id. at 1098 n.3 (emphasis
added) (citing Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Co., 451 A.2d 179, 186 & n.4
(N.J. 1982)). See also Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626,
629 (Ohio 1991) (holding that strict liability applies with equal force to a com-
mercial entity engaged in remanufacturing or rebuilding a defective product);
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Co., 451 A.2d 179, 183 (N.J. 1982) ("the fact
that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of the owner
does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for the manufac-
ture of a defective product when the injuries are suffered by an innocent foresee-
able user of the product").
95 919 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
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part were both "more than 18 years old. '96 The failed part at
issue in Altseimer was the rotor drive gear box, which had been
rebuilt by other entities on two occasions before the accident.
97
The published opinion by judge Shubb is short and does not go
into detail about the history of the gear box. The decision sug-
gests that once the part is delivered, the time period begins to
run even if the part has been moved from the original aircraft to
another aircraft, though that may not have occurred in Altseimer.
This is consistent with the underlying policy of GARA to protect
the manufacturer after original delivery since the manufacturer
retains no further control of the product after that time.
VII. EXCEPTIONS TO GARA
GARA contains four specific exceptions that are set out in
Section 2(b).
A. MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT, AND WITHHOLDING
OF INFORMATION
The first exception to GARA provides:
[I]f the claimant pleads with specificity the facts necessary to
prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to a type
certificate or airworthiness certificate for, or obligations with re-
spect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component,
system, subassembly, or other part of an aircraft knowingly mis-
represented to the Federal Aviation Administration, or con-
cealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration,
required information that is material and relevant to the per-
formance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or
the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is caus-
ally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered
98
The first phrase of this exception regarding pleading is a pro-
cedural requirement commonly found in state or local rules of
civil procedure that require plaintiffs to plead specific facts sup-
porting each element of their misrepresentation and/or con-
cealment claim. This requirement is important because it
immediately puts the burden on the claimant to affirmatively set
96 Id. at 34243.
97 Since Bell, as a manufacturer, was not involved in rebuilding the gear box,
the court did not address any issues regarding the application of GARA to the
rebuilt part. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
98 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2) (b)(1).
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forth the facts supporting each allegation.99 It is intended to
prevent plaintiffs from pleading general claims that either are
not supported by facts or are frivolous, and thus acts to bring
only justiciable issues before the court. If GARA would normally
apply but for this exception, plaintiffs still would have to plead
the specific facts in the first instance and not wait to plead until
after the manufacturer filed its answer asserting GARA as an af-
firmative defense.
At least one procedural problem arises in the application of
this exception: claimants may not have access to information
that the manufacturer has, and, therefore, by strict application,
the claimants cannot meet their burden to plead specifically.
Consequently, claimants may need to perform limited discovery
to determine whether or not such facts exist. Depending on the
circumstances, courts may stay any motions on the pleadings
pending limited pertinent discovery and allow plaintiffs to
amend their pleadings based upon the results of that
discovery.1 00
There are three areas where, if information is misrepresented,
concealed, or withheld by the manufacturer, the exemption
would apply: (1) a type certificate, (2) an airworthiness certifi-
cate,'01 or (3) the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft and/
or its parts. The subject information that relates to the issuance
of those certificates will be at least eighteen years old, if not
much older.
Under GARA, the type of information that was withheld from
the FAA must have been "required information that is material
and relevant. ' 10 2 "Required information" is not defined in
GARA, but parties can look to the FAR for some guidance. Part
21 of the FAR sets forth the procedural requirements for the
issuance of type certificates and airworthiness certificates.1 3
Part 23 prescribes the airworthiness standards that must be met
for the issuance of type certificates and includes a detailed list of
the specific standards.0 4 Even though Part 23 does not list the
required information that must be furnished to the FAA, failure
to comply with the standards set forth will constitute the with-
holding of required information. Furthermore, manufacturers
99 See id.
100 See FED. R. C. P. 56(f).
101 See discussion on type and airworthiness certificates supra part III.B.
102 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (b)(1).
103 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.321-.493.
104 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1996).
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who hold type certificates have a continuing duty to report to
the FAA all part failures, malfunctions, and defects that they de-
termine have resulted or can result in any of the occurrences
listed in the FAR. 105 This information must be reported in or-
der to obtain continuing airworthiness.106
The information withheld must be "material and relevant" to
the "performance or the maintenance or operation" of the air-
craft or part.10 7 Materiality looks to the relationship between
the proffered evidence and the issues in the case.108 Relevance
is the tendency of evidence to help establish the proposition
that it is offered to prove.109
105 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a). The Federal Aviation Regulations require type cer-
tificate manufacturers to report all defects that they determine have resulted, or
can result, in any of the following occurrences:
(1) Fires caused by a system or equipment failure, malfunction,
or defect.
(2) An engine exhaust system failure, malfunction, or defect
which causes damage to the engine, adjacent aircraft structure,
equipment, or components.
(3) The accumulation or circulation of toxic or noxious gases in
the crew compartment or passenger cabin.
(4) A malfunction, failure, or defect of a propeller control system.
(5) A propeller or rotorcraft hub or blade structural failure.
(6) Flammable fluid leakage in areas where an ignition source
normally exists.
(7) A brake system failure caused by structural or material failure
during operation.
(8) A significant aircraft primary structural defect or failure
caused by any autogenous condition (fatigue, understrength, corro-
sion, etc.).
(9) Any abnormal vibration or buffeting caused by a structural or
system malfunction, defect, or failure.
(10) An engine failure.
(11) Any structural or flight control system malfunction, defect, or
failure which causes an interference with normal control of the air-
craft or which derogates the flying qualities.
(12) A complete loss of more than one electrical power generating
system or hydraulic power system during a given operation of the
aircraft.
(13) A failure or malfunction of more than one attitude, airspeed,
or altitude instrument during a given operation of the aircraft.
Id. § 21.3(c).
The above information need not be reported if the occurrences are a result of
improper maintenance, usage, or were otherwise reported. Id. § 21.3(d) (1).
106 See id. § 21.1.
107 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2) (b)(1).
108 See 1 CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 773 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
109 See id.; see also FED. R. EID. 401.
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With regard to the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft,
the manufacturer has a duty to warn aircraft owners of all unsafe
conditions of which it is aware."1 This duty can be met in a
number of ways, depending on the nature and severity of the
problem. The concern could be inadequate operating or main-
tenance instructions, unsafe parts, or unsafe procedures or con-
ditions. The manufacturer may issue a service bulletin advising
aircraft owners and operators of a potential problem along with
a course of remedial action to alleviate the concern. If the un-
safe condition is serious, the FAA will issue an "Airworthiness
Directive," which requires compulsory compliance and contains
instructions for continued airworthiness."' In addition, manu-
facturers provide strict maintenance guidelines that must be fol-
lowed in order to maintain an aircraft in a current airworthy
condition and to allow it to fly lawfully under the FAR.1 12
In order for the first exception to GARA to apply, the infor-
mation at issue must have been (1) knowingly misrepresented to
the FAA, (2) concealed from the FAA, or (3) withheld from the
FAA.113 "Knowingly" can be an extremely difficult element to
prove. To add to the difficulty, GARA does not specifically de-
scribe the burden of proof that must be met to legally establish
"knowingly." The standard of proof will depend on the type of
motion used to raise GARA as a defense and the applicable juris-
dictional law.1 4 The initial burden of proof, however, is on the
manufacturer to show that it is entitled to a GARA defense.1 15
To date, most cases have sought judgment in favor of the manu-
ll0 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.3; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (b).
Ill See 14 C.F.R. §§ 39.1, 39.3, 39.11, 39.13. Part 39 of the FAR is entitled "Air-
worthiness Directives" and sets forth the following:
39.1 Applicability.
This part prescribes airworthiness directives that apply to aircraft,
aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances (hereinafter referred to
in this part as "products") when -
(a) An unsafe condition exists in a product; and
(b) That condition is likely to exist or develop in other products
of the same type design.
39.3 General.
No person may operate a product to which an airworthiness di-
rective applies except in accordance with the requirements of that
airworthiness directive.
Id. §§ 39.1, 39.3.
112 Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 380, 381 (D. Wyo.
1996).
113 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (b)(1).
114 See Alter, 1996 WL 617321, at *3-4.
115 See id.
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facturer by way of a motion for summary judgment.116 Rule 56
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to
establish "a genuine issue as to any material fact."
'1 17
Some jurisdictions require clear and convincing evidence to
satisfy the "knowing misrepresentation" element. It is important
to note that knowingly only precedes and, thus, only applies to
misrepresentation, and not to the concealment or withholding
of information.1 8 Absent the knowingly requirement, the bur-
den of -proof should be the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard because the intent element has been removed.1 9 As a
result, negligent withholding of information as established by a
preponderance of the evidence should be enough for the ex-
emption to apply. Therefore, if the manufacturer withheld or
concealed information that was commonly disclosed in the in-
dustry, the exception will defeat the application of GARA.
The more difficult element of proof to establish is the requi-
site causal relationship between the manufacturer's conduct and
the claimant's damage. In other words, the information that
was misrepresented, concealed, or withheld must be related to,
bring about, and be the cause of the damage.1 20 In aircraft acci-
dents, the evidence may be completely destroyed by impact or
fire. Thus, product failure in the first instance may be difficult,
if not impossible, to establish. When that is the case, the burden
of proof for asserting the exception of misrepresentation or fail-
ure to disclose may be insurmountable.
116 See, e.g., Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 342.
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f). When the evidence is sufficient so that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, the dispute as to a
material fact is "genuine." Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d
576, 580 (2d Cir. 1991). A "material fact" is one that might affect the outcome of
the case under governing law. Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121
(1st Cir. 1995).
118 As discussed later in the Article, one reported decision attempts to require
pleading of the knowledge requirement with specificity, even though "knowl-
edge" is not a prerequisite to establishing concealment or withholding. See dis-
cussion on Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. and accompanying notes infra.
119 One article mistakingly suggests that the "clear and convincing" standard
applies not only to misrepresentation, but also to concealment and presumably
to withholding of information as well. See McNatt & England, supra note 2, at
324.
120 Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 923 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D. Wyo.),
rev'd, 929 F. Supp. 380 (1996).
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One published GARA case provides guidance, as it specifically
deals with the misrepresentation issue. 12 1 Rickert v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd.1 22 arose out of the crash of a MU-2B-35-J
twin-engine turbo-prop that occurred on April 6, 1993 when pi-
lot Tom Rickert was flying a patient and two attendants on an
approach into an airport in Casper, Wyoming. The clouds were
low, requiring Rickert to fly an instrument approach. Approxi-
mately eight miles from the airport, the aircraft collided with a
tall ridge and exploded, killing all on board. Rickert's wife
brought suit in Wyoming federal district court against the air-
craft manufacturer, Mitsubishi, alleging negligence and strict li-
ability. The claims for strict liability included numerous alleged
"design defects" involving the aircraft's unsafe susceptibility to
icing and lack of adequate ice protection and ice-warning sys-
tems. After limited discovery, Mitsubishi filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, claiming that the action was barred by GARA's
eighteen-year statute of repose. Because the MU-2 aircraft was
first sold in April 1972, it was twenty-one years old at the time of
the accident. The plaintiff responded to the motion by claiming
that GARA did not apply because the fact scenario fell within
the misrepresentation exception to GARA.121
United States District Judge Brimmer granted Mitsubishi's
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, holding that Rickert was
unable to satisfy the misrepresentation, concealment, or with-
121 One unreported decision discussing the exception is Cartman v. Textron
Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., No. 94-CV-72582-DT, 1996 WL 316575, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 1996). Cartman involved an action against a component
part manufacturer. The Michigan district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment because it held that the plaintiffs evidence did not satisfy
an exception to GARA, which requires a showing that the manufacturer know-
ingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld "required information" related to
the type certificate, airworthiness certificate, or continuing airworthiness. Id. at
*3-4.
122 923 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Wyo.) [hereinafter Rickert 1], rev'd, 929 F. Supp. 380
(D. Wyo. 1996) [hereinafter Rickert I]].
123 Id. at 1454-57. In clarifying a procedural matter in its first decision, the
Rickert I court held that with regard to the misrepresentation, concealment, or
withholding of information exception, GARA requires the pleading of specific
facts necessary to prove the exception. Id. at 1456. Mitsubishi's challenge to the
adequacy of the pleadings was not raised by summary judgment under Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; it actually was raised in a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), or a motion for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c). See id. Upon finding a genuine issue of material fact, the court indi-
cated that it would have allowed the plaintiff to amend her pleadings if she had
produced facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact under GARA's "know-
ing misrepresentation" exception. Id.
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holding of information exception. 124 Mere differences of opin-
ion about design were insufficient to meet the exception.
125
Rickert then filed a motion to reconsider, which included a stay
ofjudgment pending further discovery based on allegations that
Mitsubishi had stonewalled Rickert's prior discovery efforts.
Judge Brimmer agreed and ordered limited additional discovery
to be followed by the filing of supplemental briefs on the sum-
mary judgment motion. 126 On reconsideration, the court re-
versed its prior decision to grant a summary judgment in favor
of Mitsubishi and set the case for trial on the merits.
127
In his order in Rickert II, Judge Brimmer reaffirmed the ele-
ments required for the "knowing misrepresentation" exception
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Judge
Brimmer held: "[The] exception requires a plaintiff to produce
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning: (1) knowledge; (2) misrepresentation, conceal-
ment, or withholding of required information to or from the
FAA; (3) materiality and relevance; and (4) a causal relationship
between the harm and the accident."'' 2
One concern with the court's first element is that under
GARA, the "knowledge" requirement only applies to misrepre-
sentation, not to the concealment or withholding of informa-
tion." With regard to the "casual relationship" element, the
court may have made a mistake. The causation element should
require that the information misrepresented have a nexus to the
cause of the accident, and not merely a cause between the harm
and the accident, because GARA specifically requires that the
information withheld be "causally related to the harm which the
claimant allegedly suffered." 130
Rickert's motion for reconsideration contained affidavits
from two past Mitsubishi employees. 131 In a nutshell, the affida-
vits stated that numerous MU-2 accidents were caused by the
124 Id. at 1462.
125 See id. at 1457.
126 See Rickert II, 929 F. Supp. at 381.
127 Id. at 384.
128 Id. at 381 (citing Rickert 1, 923 F. Supp. at 1456).
129 The exception applies to facts "knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the [FAA]." 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101(2) (b) (1) (emphasis added).
130 Id.
131 One of the employees was Thomas McGregor who was the Director of
Flight Operations for Mitsubishi from 1978 to 1986. The other employee, Clif-
ford Cole, worked with Mitsubishi from 1973 to 1985 as International Manager,
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build-up of excessive ice on the wings, and that this ice problem
was not investigated or disclosed to the FAA.132 According to
the affidavits, on a Special Certification Review of the MU-2 by
the FAA, Mitsubishi only tested the short body aircraft when it
knew that the problem lay with the long body aircraft."3 3 One
affidavit went on to state that "Mitsubishi actively covered-up the
problem of horizontal tail plane icing on the long body MU-2
aircraft." 134 Even though these affidavits were vigorously at-
tacked by Mitsubishi from all angles, 135 the court held that the
affidavits created an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat
summary judgment.136 Judge Brimmer concluded:
This case should stand as a lesson for all plaintiffs who would
bring product[s] liability lawsuits against aircraft manufacturers.
GARA erects a formidable first hurdle to such suits, not only at
the summary judgment stage but also at the trial stage. The
plaintiff who leaps GARA's knowing misrepresentation exception
then faces the usual product[s] liability obstacles.
Rickert's task, therefore, is two-fold. She must satisfy GARA's
knowing misrepresentation exception, and then prove her prod-
uct[s] liability claims.' 37
The decision in Rickert II places a strong burden on plaintiffs
to offer very specific evidence of knowledge of material facts suf-
ficient to establish misrepresentation. The court, however, did
not deal with the aspects of the exception concerning conceal-
ment or withholding of information, even though the plaintiff
proffered evidence in support thereof. Rickert II recognizes that
even if GARA is defeated on a motion for summary judgment, it
may not sleep for long, as it can later be raised in the form of a
directed verdict or jury verdict.
B. THE "EMERGENCY" EXCEPTION
In its second exception, GARA provides that it does not apply
"if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made
is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical
South American Regional Manager, and International Vice President. Rickert II,




135 See id. at 383.
16 Id. The court opined that "at the summaryjudgment stage, the [c]ourt will
neither weigh evidence nor assess credibility." Id.
137 Id. at 383-84.
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or other emergency. '' 1 8 The policy behind this exception is
clear-a medical patient typically will not be able to choose to
fly in an aircraft that is less than eighteen years old. In most
cases, there will be a lack of informed consent, particularly since
some patients may be unconscious. Even if the patients are con-
scious and require emergency air transport, they are probably
under duress and likely on medication. The only patients who
are entitled to this exception are the ones who are on the flight
"for the purpose of receiving treatment for a medical .
emergency."1 3 9
Although the phrase "or other emergency" is not defined,
there is a similar policy to include it in the exception. As writ-
ten, the phrase can be read two ways: (1) "if the person for
whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for
purposes of ...other emergency," or (2) "if the person for
whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for
purposes of receiving treatment for [an] .. .emergency." The
first interpretation is the better one because it is more consis-
tent with the underlying policy of the exception since in an
emergency, the passenger may not be in a position to make a
clear decision whether or not to ride in an aircraft. For in-
stance, an emergency may include situations where medical
treatment was not provided, such as air evacuation from areas
threatened by flood, fire, and sea rescue.
The "emergency" exception is limited to claims made for in-
jury or death to a passenger, but it is not clear what constitutes a
"passenger." According to Part 1 of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, a flightcrew member is a "pilot, flight engineer, or flight
navigator assigned to duty in an aircraft during flight time, u4 °
and, therefore, is clearly not a "passenger." But what about
medical and rescue personnel on board? They are not part of
the flightcrew; thus, the issue is to determine whether they are
"crewmembers" or "passengers."
Although Part 1 does not define passenger, it is clear that if
such personnel are not crewmembers, they can only be passen-
gers. Part 1 lends little guidance because the definition of
crewmember is vague, describing a crewmember as "a person
assigned to perform duty in an aircraft during flight time." | 4 1 A
138 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (b) (2).
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
141 Id.
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crewmember's duty in the aircraft should relate to the safety of
the flight, such as the work of a flight attendant, and not to du-
ties that relate solely to the emergency. In addition, emergency
personnel may have significant duties that do not take place
"during flight time." Thus, in a situation that does not involve
"passengers for the purpose of receiving medical treatment,"
but is an "other emergency," non-crewmembers should be con-
sidered "passengers" who may assert the second exception.
C. THE "NOT ABOARD" EXCEPTION
GARA also does not apply "if the person for whose injury or
death the claim is being made was not aboard the aircraft at the
time of the accident."'14 2 The policy behind this exception may
be that persons who are not on board the aircraft do not assume
any of the associated risks inherent in flying the aircraft. They
are like innocent bystanders. This exception only contains two
requisite elements that must be met. "Aboard" means on the
aircraft, and not embarking or disembarking to the extent that
it takes place outside the plane of the aircraft fuselage. The
"time of the accident" element means at the time of the event
that causes the damage, even if the damage itself does not arise
when the accident occurs.
It is important to note that GARA applies to "damages for
death or injury to persons or damage to property."143 However, the
third exception does not include claims for property damage.
Thus, a claim by plaintiffs who suffered only a loss of property is
subject to a GARA defense, unless they also suffered "injury or
death," which acts to remove the application of GARA from all
claims, including those alleging property damage. This appears
to be a drafting error because the policy to protect innocent
bystanders should also include protection against property dam-
age, as they are both external to the aircraft, are unrelated to
the aircraft's flight operations, and do not assume any risk asso-
ciated with flying an aircraft more than eighteen years old.
D. THE "ExPREss WARRANT"' EXCEPTION
The final exception to GARA is one in contract for an express
warranty. GARA is inapplicable "to an action brought under a
written warranty enforceable under law but for the operation of
142 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (b) (3).
143 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2) (a) (emphasis added).
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this Act."144 Thus, when a manufacturer expressly agrees to war-
rant its product beyond GARA's eighteen-year repose period,
that warranty waives any limitations in GARA and will be treated
as an exception. Determining whether a warranty exists raises
another controversy. 145
VIII. OTHER PROVISIONS
Two other provisions require brief mention: the preemption
provision and the effective date provision.
A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
Section 2(d), which is entitled "Relationship to Other Laws,"
states that GARA expressly preempts such law to the extent that
such state law allows an action to be brought beyond the eight-
een-year limitation period.146 GARA's exact words are: "This
section supersedes any State law to the extent that such law per-
mits a civil action described in subsection (a) to be brought af-
ter the applicable limitation period for such civil action
established by subsection (a)."' 47 The preemption is limited to
state statutes granting claimants more rights. Thus, if a state has
an applicable statute of repose that is for a shorter duration,
GARA will not affect that statute.
In August of 1994, sixteen states enacted statutes of repose for
products liability claims. 14 Some of the statutes ran for as few as
five years, while others ran up to twelve years. Another type of
statute of repose runs for the "useful safe life" of the product.
GARA will not affect these statutes except to place a cap on the
"useful safe life" in jurisdictions where a court might otherwise
find the useful life to be more than eighteen years.1 49
144 Id. § 40101 (2) (b) (4). "This means that in the event a manufacturer desires
to specifically warrant the safety of its product for a period of time beyond the
applicable statute of repose, the courts would honor the manufacturer's written
warranty." H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1644, 1649.
145 For example, in Alter (discussed supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text),
the plaintiff alleged that omission of specific engine inspection instructions con-
stituted an express (or implied) warranty that the engine could be adequately
inspected as set out in the manuals. See Alter, 1996 WL 617321, at *5-6.
146 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2) (d).
147 Id.
148 See McNatt & England, supra note 2, at 327-42 (discussing the various state
statutes of repose).
149 See, e.g., id. at 335-36 (discussing Kansas case law regarding "useful safe
life").
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The question on state law preemption arose in Wright v. Bond-
Air, Ltd.,150 where the plaintiff's husband was killed while flying
a Cessna 310L twin engine airplane. The plaintiff brought suit
in state court, alleging negligence and breach of warranty
against Cessna and Teledyne, the manufacturers of the engine.
The two defendants removed the action to federal district court,
claiming that GARA had vested the federal court with subject
matter jurisdiction.' 1 The plaintiff moved to remand the case
to state court, and the federal court ordered the defendants to
show cause as to why the case should not be remanded for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 152
After the defendants failed to meet their burden, Federal Dis-
trict Judge Edmunds granted the motion to remand, holding
that the plaintiffs state law causes of action did not constitute a
"substantial federal question" and, therefore, were not pre-
empted by federal law.153 While GARA is a federal law that may
affect state statutes of limitations or repose, it does not act to
preempt the substantive state law claims of negligence and
breach of warranty. 15 4 The Wright court held that:
[P]laintiff's complaint alleging violations of FAA regulations in
an attempt to invoke a GARA exception, when Congress has de-
termined that there should be no private federal cause of action
under GARA and when Congress has not provided a private fed-
eral remedy for FAA violations, does not state a claim "arising
under" federal law. 155
As a result, merely raising GARA as a defense is not sufficiently
substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.156
B. THE "EFFECTIVE DATE"
The last provision in GARA is Section 4, which is entitled "Ef-
fective Date; Application of Act." Section 4(a) simply states that
150 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
15 Id. at 301. Removal was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (set-
ting forth federal question jurisdiction).
152 Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 301-02.
153 Id. at 302.
154 Id. The court concluded that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 "does not
preempt traditional state law claims for negligence and does not provide for a
private right of action for violations of FAA regulations." Id. at 305 (citing Margo-





GARA takes effect on the date of enactment, which was August
17, 1994.157 The application provision of Section 4(b) recog-
nizes that GARA does not apply to actions commenced before
the date of enactment. 158 For example, in Altseimer v. Bell Heli-
copter Textron, Inc., 59 the federal district court specifically held
that since the action was commenced by the filing of the com-
plaint on May 23, 1995, GARA applied, and summary judgment
in favor of the manufacturer was warranted.
Similarly, in Cartman v. Textron,1 60 the plaintiff filed his origi-
nal complaint more than two months before the enactment of
GARA. However, he did not serve his amended complaint on
Rogers Corporation, the manufacturer of the faulty carburetor
that allegedly caused the plane crash injuring the plaintiff, until
May of 1995, approximately seven months after the enactment
of GARA. When Rogers raised the GARA defense, the plaintiff
took the position that the amended complaint "relates back" to
the date the original complaint was filed, pursuant to Rule 15(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 61 The court rejected
the plaintiffs argument, holding that at least one element was
not met because Rogers had no notice of the action before the
enactment of GARA and, therefore, would be prejudiced by the
plaintiffs failure to provide notice.1 6 2 According to the Cartman
court, notice before the enactment of GARA was "crucial."' 63
IX. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF GARA
As reflected in the Altseimer and Rickert decisions, GARA is def-
initely having an effect on actions against manufacturers. As the
Altseimer court recognized, "[A]ithough harsh, such result [of
denying plaintiffs' claims if the aircraft and/or its parts are older
than eighteen years at the time of the crash] is consistent with
the purpose of GARA .... ,"164 However, aircraft will continue to
crash, and claimants, through their attorneys, will look for rec-
ompense wherever it may be found. When GARA is raised as a
defense, plaintiffs are confronted with a significant hurdle. It is
anticipated that a tremendous amount of work will go toward
157 49 U.S.C. § 40101(4) (a).
158 Id. § 40101 (4) (b).
159 919 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
160 No. 94-CV-72582-DT, 1996 WL 316575, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 1996).
161 Id. at *2.
162 Id. at *2-3.
163 Id. at *2.
164 Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 342.
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establishing the misrepresentation, concealment, or withhold-
ing exception. Even though GARA requires plaintiffs to plead
specific facts necessary to prove this exception, as reflected in
Rickert II, it is likely judges will be lenient in allowing limited
discovery of facts relating to GARA.
Absent an exception, GARA will cause plaintiffs to shift away
from targeting manufacturers as defendants and move toward
other entities who may be at fault. Future target defendants will
include mechanics and maintenance repair facilities as well as
aircraft owners and operators. Since an aircraft is presumed to
be safely designed and constructed after eighteen years of use,
plaintiffs may claim that any product failure was caused by negli-
gent ownership, operation, inspection, or maintenance of the
aircraft.
One aspect that must be reviewed is the number of general
aviation aircraft that are more than eighteen years old and, thus,
protected under GARA. The booms and busts of the general
aviation manufacturing industry have been quite sporadic since
1950. 165 In that year, approximately 3500 aircraft were built.
The industry enjoyed a rapid and consistent rise in production
until 1965, the year that nearly 16,000 aircraft were constructed.
Production tapered off to a temporary low of 7000 per year in
1970 and 1971, after which it climbed to an all-time high of
nearly 18,000 in 1978. Then the crash began. By 1980, produc-
tion dropped to 12,000. Two years later, in 1982, production
was more than 2000, but has remained below 2000 units annu-
ally since 1982.166
What is of great significance is the effect of GARA on the
number of aircraft that it will cover from its inception in 1994
until 1998. In rough calculation, when GARA was signed, it im-
mediately covered approximately 48% of the general aviation
aircraft built since 1950 (48% of the aircraft had been built
before 1976, which was the eighteen-year cutoff). However, be-
cause of the boom in the late 1970s and the bust since the early
1980s, the current and immediate rate of increase aircraft cov-
ered by GARA is astounding. By 1995, 58% of the aircraft were
covered. By 1996, 68% were covered; the number is expected to
165 The figures contained in this paragraph are taken from Tarry & Truitt,




rise to 77% by 1997 and to 85% by 1998.67 One may accurately
predict the decrease in claims against manufacturers on a re-
lated scale, with a corresponding decrease in insurance
premiums.
X. CONCLUSION
It is important to note that GARA is not the end-all solution to
get the general aviation manufacturing industry back on its feet,
as products liability claims were only one of many factors that
led to the sharp fall in production. 168 However, with the enlight-
ening announcement from Cessna Aircraft Company that it
would resume manufacturing piston-powered general aviation
aircraft, thereby creating many new jobs, 169 and the increased
likelihood that GARA will help pull Piper Aircraft Company out
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 71 the anticipated positive economic
effects of GARA should not be overlooked, even though the ex-
tent of those effects is not known.
GARA itself is ambiguous in many areas. Attorneys and courts
alike will be challenged for years to come in establishing case
law that will interpret and apply each and every provision of
GARA. As for the present, the flow of cases has just begun.
167 Id. These figures do not take into account aircraft manufactured after
1992. However, even with an increase in production, those added figures will
have an insignificant effect on the 45-year statistical period.
168 See generally id. at 190-200 (discussing numerous factors that led to the mas-
sive drop in aircraft production and recognizing the dangers of placing all the
blame on tort lawsuits).
169 Donald A. Andersen, Recent Cases and Developments in Aviation Law, 60J. AiR
L. & CoM. 3, 84 (1994). On October 27, 1993, Cessna President Russ Meyer
represented to the Senate Aviation Subcommittee that if a statute of repose was
passed, Cessna would increase production to the extent that 25,000jobs would be
created within five years after passage. McNatt & England, supra note 2, at 325.
However, the anticipated spool-up in production and orders has been slow. As of
April 1996, the first Cessna 172 manufactured in 10 years made its maiden trial
flight; meanwhile, Cessna had only 300 deposited agreements to purchase its
light aircraft. First New Cessna 172 Flies, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 29,
1996, at 21.
170 Andersen, supra note 169, at 84.
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APPENDIX
GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
Pub. L. 103-298, Aug. 17, 1994, 108 Stat. 1552, provided that:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994'.
SEC. 2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no
civil action for damages for death or injury to persons or dam-
age to property arising out of an accident involving a general
aviation aircraft may be brought against the manufacturer of the
aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, sub-
assembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manu-
facturer if the accident occurred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first pur-
chaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer;
or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person
engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassem-
bly, or other part which replaced another component, system,
subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to,
the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused such death, in-
jury, or damage, after the applicable limitation period begin-
ning on the date of completion of the replacement or addition.
(b) ExcEPTIONs.-Subsection (a) does not apply-
(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts neces-
sary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with respect to
a type certificate or airworthiness certificate for, or obligations
with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an aircraft or a com-
ponent, system, subassembly, or other part of an aircraft know-
ingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation Administration, or
concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, required information that is material and relevant to the
performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft,
or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is




(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claims is
being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment
for a medical or other emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is be-
ing made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident;
or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty enforce-
able under law but for the operation of the Act.
(c) GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT DEFINED.-For the purposes
of this Act, the term 'general aviation aircraft' means any air-
craft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate
has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, which, at the time such certificate was originally
issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 passen-
gers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined under regu-
lations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. App. 1301 et seq.) [see 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq.] at the
time of the accident.
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAws.-This section supersedes
any State law to the extent that such law permits a civil action
described in subsection (a) to be brought after the applicable
limitation period for such civil action established by subsection
(a).
SEC. 3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act-
(1) the term 'aircraft' has the meaning given such term in
section 101 (5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
1301(5)) [see 49 U.S.C. 40102(a) (6)];
(2) the term 'airworthiness certificate' means an airworthi-
ness certificate issued under section 603(c) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(c)) [see 49 U.S.C.
44704(c) (1)] or under any predecessor Federal statute;
(3) the term 'limitation period' means 18 years with re-
spect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems,
subassemblies, and other parts of such aircraft; and
(4) the term 'type certificate' means a type certificate is-
sued under section 603(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(49 U.S.C. 1423(a)) [see 49 U.S.C. 44704(a)] or under any
predecessor Federal statute.
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SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF ACT.
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Except as provided in subsection (b),
this Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
[Aug. 17, 1994].
(b) APPLICATION OF AcT.-This Act shall not apply with re-
spect to civil actions commenced before the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.
